Spreckley’s Richard Merrin, My Friday’s George Candon and Red Rose Associates’ Paul Nicholson set out the opportunities and challenges of cross-Channel relations ahead of the UK-EU 20 November summit.
Burnham’s Brussels moment
Andy Burnham is sure to bring more to the table than any UK Prime Minister since 2016 at the EU-UK Summit on 20 November. The summit is set to stamp the seal on a raft of deals close to signature; what the Labour government has yielded to be in this position says a lot about how far it is willing to go in this new chapter.
Three main pieces of the puzzle are almost completely in place. The UK will rejoin Erasmus+ in 2027. A food-safety agreement (SPS) that would remove most checks on agrifood trade is for sign-off – as long as the UK accepts ‘dynamic alignment’, meaning it follows EU food law as they change. The carbon markets deal is within reach, which would exempt UK exporters from the EU’s carbon border charge and EU exporters from Britain’s.
To arrive at this point, London has offered to cut university fees for EU students, partly in the hope of a place in the EU’s Made in Europe industrial plans. The youth experience scheme is the last big gap, and Brussels has made clear the other deals depend on it.
Few of these concessions would have been offered a few years ago. Following EU regulations, even in narrow areas, crosses lines that seemed the most crimson after Brexit. Access, whether through fees or contributions, means accepting the costs of closer ties, while remaining outside the Union. What London has offered is the easier part of the story to tell. What Brussels expects, and how much of it British politics can carry, is the harder question, and it is the one we have been putting to people in both capitals.
Europe warms, but cooly recalls
The reset initiative is being received relatively well in Brussels, and attitudes towards the UK are significantly warmer than at any point since 2016. Nothing focuses attention like a truculent Trump administration, which has made closer trade, tariff and security ties more attractive. War in Ukraine and ambiguous US support for NATO is incentivising deeper defence spending and collaboration across Europe. The Middle East crisis keeps energy prices high, and China’s steady growth and willingness to restrict access to critical minerals has reminded both sides how exposed supply chains remain.
Against that backdrop, partnerships are being built and rebuilt across the globe, and the EU and the UK have found that they may share more common interest than Brexit suggested.
Welcome back, but for how long?
The mood music in Brussels is that while the UK economy took a hit, Brexit has cost the EU too. That’s why there is real interest in the growth closer ties could bring. But that sentiment is far from universal, and several Member States will want to know what relationship the UK is seeking, and whether it will stay the course. Regret about Brexit is real in Brussels, but it does not erase reservations. EU officials have dealt with five British prime ministers in the last five years, know free movement remains a sore point in British politics, and are positively restive about the prospects of Reform. As a Labour MP put it plainly in a recent Brussels policy event. “will the EU be persuaded that we won’t want to change our minds again?”
That nervousness is reflected in the conditionalities being built into the proposed deals working in parallel. The draft joint statement circulating in Brussels ahead of the 20 November summit has the food and carbon deals concluded but not in force until youth mobility and fees for EU students are settled. That gap may be closing following London’s offer of £450m to level out UK university fees for EU students.
Made in Europe is the next test. The UK’s fee-subsidy is clearly anchored at lubricating access to the EU’s privileged domestic producer industrial programme, and seems to be gaining traction: at a recent EU-UK-focused event in Brussels, a leading Italian MEP argued that favouring European production should not shut out the UK, as the EU needed to build preferred partnerships with like-minded democracies.
That’s all fine for Friday, but who’s to say how the mood may change in the EU across the coming year? Spain’s snap election is imminent. France selects a new parliament and president in spring, Italy must go to the polls by the end of 2027, and the AfD surge keeps Germany politics there on a knife edge. What EU politics will look like this time next year is anyone’s guess.
A single market, without the sides?
Discussion in the UK is about what the eventual reset will look like: single market, customs union, free movement. But Barnier, who led the EU’s Brexit negotiations, has been sending unsubtle shots across the bow that “the four freedoms are clearly the four conditions to be inside a single market” and that there can be “no single market à la carte”. They UK may be suffering Brexit buyer’s remorse, but to misappropriate a former (admittedly pre-accession) prime minister’s claim that the UK had never had it so good may land even more rudely if the EU sticks hard and fast to the inviolability of the four fundamental freedoms.
Aligning with EU food law would narrow some freedoms the UK enjoys, such as in gene-editing, which could adversely affect the UK’s attraction to researchers and investors who chose Britain for its lighter regulation. A UK inside the EU customs union no longer strike its own trade deals – but what it would lose in bilaterals it would gain in accessing the heftier EU-negotiated deals with third countries.
What’s left and what’s right for the UK?
Fading red lines
Labour has stopped arguing about whether Britain should be closer to the European Union. The argument is now is about how far and how fast the UK government can go without reopening the divisions of the past decade. Andy Burnham has been more willing to talk about where the relationship might ultimately lead.
Conversations our partners Red Rose Associates have had with Labour MPs suggest the party is readier to have that discussion in the open. Longstanding pro-Europeans want more ambition. Their case is that the world has changed since 2016, and that the reset is a start they want to go well beyond. One senior pro-European MP told us that everything must now be on the table, including dropping the 2024 red lines.
A pro-European northern MP was more cautious. Practical steps such as rejoining Erasmus+ matter, they argued, but Labour cannot set out on a path to rejoining without a fresh mandate, and the result of the next election is by no means certain. That caution is widely shared. Even MPs who strongly support closer cooperation accept that the government has to show practical benefits for businesses and communities first.
The agreements being pursued ahead of the summit on 20 November are a chance to show that practical cooperation pays off without testing the manifesto commitments. Most of the party will welcome the summit deals as evidence that the reset is delivering, encouraging pro-Europeans to push for the 2024 red lines to be dropped from the next manifesto. Others, particularly those representing Brexit-voting constituencies, will warn against reopening a debate that remains politically divisive.
The Right’s rebellion
If Burnham thinks the national sentiment has shifted, that’s not reflected in the rhetoric emanating from the right of the British political establishment. For Britain’s political right, the EU-UK reset risks becoming one of the most consequential miscalculations of Andy Burnham’s premiership. They emphasise that Labour’s 2024 manifesto explicitly ruled out returning to the single market, customs union or freedom of movement. For Conservatives and Reform UK alike, the fear is that a supposedly technical reset becomes a gradual political reversal of Brexit without the electorate being asked to approve it.
Kemi Badenoch’s position is to distinguish practical commercial cooperation from what she terms regulatory subordination. The Conservatives have established clear objections to dynamic alignment, renewed European Court of Justice jurisdiction and financial concessions which they say diminish Britain’s independence. Their objection is that Britain risks becoming a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker, accepting future European regulations without meaningful influence over their formulation – curiously the very same argument that Burnham proposes for the potential option of even rejoining the EU.
Unlike the Conservatives, Reform has signalled a willingness to revisit existing post-Brexit agreements as well as reverse new commitments. This creates a substantial political risk for Brussels: agreements negotiated with the present government may face determined opposition, renegotiation or attempted reversal under a future Reform administration. For any organisation engaging with the reset, the opposition’s thinking therefore needs to be understood as closely as the government’s, which is why our work spans both sides of British politics.
The lesson for both London and Brussels is that technical agreements cannot be insulated indefinitely from democratic politics. A successful relationship must command enough public and parliamentary confidence to survive successive governments. Without that consent, the reset risks becoming not a lasting settlement, but the opening chapter of another prolonged and damaging argument about Britain’s place in Europe.
British business bid
For British business the picture is more nuanced than either political camp sometimes acknowledges.
A commercially credible reset should demonstrate measurable economic benefits, transparent costs, proportionate governance arrangements and clearly defined limits on any transfer of regulatory authority. The rule-taker argument is one we hear from business contacts on both sides of the Channel, many of whom support closer trade but are wary of where alignment might eventually lead.
Exporters, food producers, manufacturers and smaller businesses have legitimate reasons to seek fewer border checks, simpler certification, predictable carbon-pricing arrangements and improved access to European customers. Businesses also need certainty over future compliance costs, the ability to trade competitively beyond Europe and confidence that today’s agreements will survive changes of government across both the UK and the EU.
Our expectation is that Burnham maintain the existing red lines for this parliament while keeping longer-term options open. For businesses, understanding how that debate develops within Labour will be just as important as the agreements reached in Brussels this month.
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